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Abstract 
Does guilt affect performance? Exploiting a novel measure of the justification 
of penalty calls, we find that unjustified penalty calls negatively affect penalty 
conversion rates, and that this effect increases with social norms of trust. 
Exploiting the variance arising from players who do not play in their countries 
of origin by including the norms of both the league and the kickers’ countries 
of origin, we separate the constraints on egoism into two categories:  internal 
sanctions, such as guilt, and external sanctions, such as shame. We find that 
both guilt and shame affect the performance of penalty kickers. 
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“There was all the talk of ‘did he dive or didn’t he’ but I just lost 
momentum when I jumped over [David Seaman] and fell over. […] It 
wasn’t a penalty and because he was my mate from the England side, I 
just said it wasn’t a penalty. […]. I didn’t miss the penalty on purpose, 
it was just a bad penalty but they all are when you don’t score them…” 
1.Fowler eibRob – 
1. Introduction 
March 24, 1997. Liverpool travels to meet Arsenal at Highbury, London. 
Liverpool were leading 1–0 against Arsenal early in the second half when 
Liverpool’s striker Robbie Fowler appeared to have been brought down in the 
box by Arsenal goalkeeper David Seaman and was awarded a penalty. Much 
to everyone’s surprise, Fowler went to the referee, Gerald Ashby, to correct the 
decision, claiming the keeper had not touched him. Ashby was unmoved by 
Fowler's honesty and stuck by his original decision. Fowler’s penalty was 
saved by David Seaman, though Jason McAteer scored the rebound, and 
Liverpool went on to win the game 2–1. Fowler later received a Fair Play 
award from the Union of European Football Associations for his honesty. 
The case of Fowler's penalty seems to deviate from a standard analysis of 
rational strategies, suggesting that other determinants should be considered. 
Our study explores the relationship between culture and penalty-kick 
performance, specifically the mechanism of trust and guilt aversion. As Arrow 
(1972, p. 357) put it, "Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself 
an element of trust.” Societies characterized by high levels of trust are less 
dependent on formal institutions to enforce agreements. Instead, social norms 
act as constraints on egoism, through internal sanctions, such as guilt, and 
external sanctions, such as shame and ostracism.  
Several studies have documented the effects of trust on economic performance. 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) find that higher levels of associational 
                                                 
1 Kelly (2015). 
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memberships are related to higher incomes in Tanzania. Knack and Keefer 
(1997) find evidence that “social capital” affects economic performance, using 
indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys (WVS). 
Individuals are defined as guilt averse if their values satisfy what their 
conscience or what other individuals expect of them. Not doing so causes a 
feeling of guilt which decreases the individual’s utility and therefore affects 
decision making.2 While studies in experimental economics have found 
evidence for guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) and quantitated 
the importance of guilt aversion for players (Bellemare, Sebald, & Strobel, 
2011), these studies have some causal inference limitations. Participants 
reported that their beliefs might be affected by their intended decisions rather 
than the other way around. Furthermore, laboratory experiments are usually 
conducted on a homogenous and selective population, mostly students, which 
prevents the analysis of a heterogenic response based on cultural and social 
background. Finally, these kinds of experiments do not have any ramifications 
on the experimenter's life, making moral decisions much easier. 
Our study exploits a unique dataset on penalties, including penalties that were 
taken in five major European football leagues, in order to overcome the casual 
inference challenge using a quasi-natural experiment framework. Our dataset 
includes information on whether the penalty was rightly awarded. We surmise 
that the penalty kicker's performance will be negatively affected by his guilt 
aversion if the penalty has not been rightly awarded. By including a common-
social-norms measure from the WVS, we show that this adverse effect is 
differential and depends on the norms of trust in the league in which the teams 
play. We strengthen our main results by using a supplemental and more 
comprehensive dataset, which enables us to show that the results are not an 
artifact of a small sample size bias. 
                                                 
2 People also dislike lying and often avoid it even in situations in which lies cannot be detected. 
When the moral cost of lying is offset by engaging in normatively acceptable behavior, such as 
collaborating with others, people lie more than in comparable settings in which they work 
alone. Soraperra et al. (2017) find that the frequency of dyads in which both players are honest 
is lower in collaboration than in the norm exposure setting. 
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Moreover, by exploiting the variance arising from players who play outside of 
their countries of origin, we include a measure of norms both in the league in 
which the match takes place and in the kickers' countries and/or continents of 
origin. This enriches the analysis of the culturally heterogeneous effect. 
Importantly, in our results, we can shed some light on the separation of 
constraints on egoism between guilt and shame. That is because the external 
sanctions being imposed by the fans and the media should affect foreign 
players and local players evenly, while each group should be affected 
differently by its own internal guilt sanction. We show that the guilt effect can, 
in fact, be differentiated into a guilt effect and a shame effect.  
This article is constructed as follows: in section 2, we provide a non-exhaustive 
literature review; section 3 describes the data and offers some descriptive 
statistics; section 4 is the estimation part, containing results from multivariate 
analysis; in section 5 we provide a robustness test using a larger data set; in 
section 6 we differentiate between guilt and shame effects; section 7 concludes.  
2. A Literature Review of Penalty Kicks 
Economics literature usually analyses penalty kicks in a game theory 
framework. Chiappori and Groseclose (2002) studied penalty kicks as an 
application for mixed strategies. They report that they cannot reject the 
assumption that players optimally choose strategies, conditional on their 
opponent's behavior. Palacios-Huerta (2003) discusses the implications of the 
"Minimax Theorem" using penalty kicks as natural data. He reports that the 
results are consistent with equilibrium play. 
Empirical studies on penalty-kick performance usually explore the game 
strategies or the link between the players' quality and the chance of scoring a 
penalty. Some of the recent publications are Bar-Eli Azar, Ritov, Keidar-Levin, 
& Schein (2007), Baumann, Friehe, & Wedow (2011), and Buzzacchi and 
Pedrini (2014). Empirical studies that are more related to non-rational effects 
on penalty kicks' performance are scarce, and none of them explore the effect 
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of guilt aversion. Jordet, Hartman, Visscher, & Lemmink (2007) explore the 
relationship between stress and performance on shootouts in the World Cup, 
European Championships, and Copa America between 1976 and 2004. They 
find that stress seems to be negatively related to the outcomes of the kicks, 
whereas skill and fatigue were either less related or unrelated to performance. 
The authors conclude that psychological components are highly influential on 
the outcome of penalty kicks. Dohmen (2008) also provides some empirical 
evidence for the effect of psychological pressure on penalty-kick performance.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data we use was provided by Redwood International Sports. The 
company specializes in gathering data from sporting events, including football 
(soccer). For the purpose of this research, each penalty kick was examined 
thoroughly to decide whether it was a justified call, an ambiguous one, or 
clearly a wrong one. This is our variable of interest. 
Assuming there is a guilt effect, if the penalty kicker is the player who was 
fouled, it should affect his shot. However, although we do not know whether 
the kicker was the player who was fouled (in case this is the reason for the 
penalty call), we suggest two reasons why the extent to which the penalty was 
rightly awarded might affect the kicker. First, in most cases, the strikers are the 
ones who are both given and kicking the penalty kick. Second, in case the 
kicker is not the player who was fouled, the defending team and the crowd 
reacts differently in unjustified cases. Thus the kicker has at least some 
indication of the level of justification of the call. 
Our main data consists of 1,388 penalty kicks taken in league matches in the 
five biggest leagues in Europe (Italy, Germany, England, Spain, and France) 
between the 2006–2007 and 2013–2014 football (soccer) seasons. For technical 
reasons, not all penalty kicks taken in these seasons were coded, but since the 
omitted penalty kicks do not have any unique characteristics, our data does 
not suffer from selection bias.  
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Each penalty kick was analyzed, and the analyst decided whether it was a 
justified, marginal, or incorrect call. We transform this variable into a 
dichotomous one, labeled INCORRECT, which takes 0 for a justified or 
marginal call and 1 for an incorrect one. We summarized these penalties and 
their outcomes in Figure 1 and Table 1. 103 calls (7.4%) were incorrect calls, 
while the rest are marginal or justified (hereafter we use the term justified for 
all non-incorrect calls). The rate of success (meaning: goal) is independent of 
the nature of the call and is quite similar to the rate found in all penalty 
research, which is around 80%. 
 
Table 1: Penalty kicks conversion rates, by league, kicker’s continent, and the 
justification of the call 
 All calls 
True or marginal 
calls Incorrect calls 
 
𝑁 
conversion 
rate 
𝑁 
conversion 
rate 
𝑁 
conversion 
rate 
Total 1,388 77.7% 1,285 77.7% 103 77.7% 
 By league 
England 314 76.1% 294 76.5% 20 70.0% 
France 158 80.4% 148 79.7% 10 90.0% 
Germany 176 76.1% 160 78.1% 16 56.3% 
Italy 410 78.8% 380 78.4% 30 83.3% 
Spain 330 77.6% 303 76.9% 27 85.2% 
 By kicker's continent of origin 
Africa 126 72.2% 119 70.6% 7 100.0% 
Asia 21 81.0% 21 81.0% 0 – 
Europe 989 78.2% 913 78.8% 76 71.1% 
North America 6 33.3% 6 33.3% 0 – 
South America 246 79.7% 226 78.3% 20 95.0% 
Source: authors' calculations. 
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Figure 1: Conversion rates of justified and unjustified penalty kicks, by league 
 
Notes: The rates in the figure are the raw conversion rates of 1,388 penalty 
kicks. We gathered both justified and marginal calls under the title "Justified.” 
Source: authors' calculations. 
 
The first differences appear when we look at penalty kicks by league. While 
the rate of incorrect calls is similar and moves between 6.3% and 9%, and so is 
the total conversion rate (76.5%–79.7%), the rate of success in incorrect calls is 
highly volatile and runs from 56.3% in the German Bundesliga to 90% in the 
French Ligue 1. Since non-local players are quite common, we calculate the 
rate of success in relation to the kicker’s continent of origin and find that while 
among the three main continents (Europe, South America, and Africa) the rate 
of success of all penalties is similar, this rate differs dramatically when there is 
an incorrect call. European kickers succeed in only 71.1% of incorrect-call 
kicks, while their South American colleagues have a 95% success rate (Figure 2 
and Table 1). 
76.5% 79.7% 78.1% 78.4% 76.9%
70.0%
90.0%
56.3%
83.3% 85.2%
England France Germany Italy Spain
Justified Unjustified
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Figure 2: Conversion rates of justified and unjustified penalty kicks, by kicker's 
continent of origin  
 
Notes: The rates in the figure are the raw conversion rates of 1,388 penalty 
kicks. Only kickers from continents in which at least one unjustified penalty 
was taken were included. Both justified and marginal calls are included under 
the title "Justified.” Source: authors' calculations. 
 
As already mentioned, societies characterized by high levels of trust use social 
norms as constraints on egoism. We, therefore, expect to find the strongest 
effect of guilt on the probability of scoring a penalty in countries with high 
levels of trust. We do so using data from the WVS, which has recorded 
people’s values and beliefs over time in nearly 100 countries since 1981. 
Figure 3 is based on data from the WVS, and it shows that Germany has the 
highest levels of trust among the five countries whose leagues we analyze. 
Figure 3 shows that European countries are also usually characterized by 
higher levels of trust than South American countries. Since an unjustified 
penalty call can be seen as a specific case in which norms and values affect 
performance, the correlation between our results and the WVS results is not 
surprising. It may suggest that values and norms affect performance.  
 
 
70.6%
78.8% 78.3%
100.0%
71.1%
95.0%
Africa Europe South America
Justified Unjustified
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Figure 3: Can most people be trusted? 
 
Notes: The share of positive answers in selected European (blue) and South 
American (light blue) countries. The shares are the average of the reported 
shares in the 2005–2009 and 2010–2014 surveys where available, or the latest 
reported share in countries that were not surveyed twice. The full sample and 
continent average is the non-weighted average of all countries in the WVS 
(around 80) or all the continent countries, respectively. Source: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp 
4. Multivariate Analysis 
Clearly, the analysis above could be misleading, since many other factors can 
affect the probability of scoring and might also affect the probability of making 
an unjustified call. In order to eliminate this concern, we gather a wide range 
of variables that characterize various aspects of each penalty kick. In 
particular, we explore data on the kicker, the goalkeeper, the penalty kick, and 
the current situation in the match at the time the penalty was called. In 
addition, we also include the social norms, as measured by the WVS, in the 
country of the league, the country of origin of the kicker and, alternatively, in 
the continent of origin of the kicker (calculated as the average of all countries 
in the continent). Except for the WVS values, most of the data we use was 
kindly provided to us by Redwood International Sports. The remainder was 
collected from online archives, especially transfermarkt.com. A detailed 
description of the data and its source is given in Table A.1 of the appendix. 
39.2%
30.3% 30.0% 27.5%
24.6%
19.4% 19.2% 18.7% 18.3%
12.4% 12.3%
9.2% 8.2%
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We first run a set of t-tests for differences between the mean of the 
characteristics in each group, that is, justified versus unjustified calls. The 
results show that the assumption of no difference in the averages of all 
characteristics cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level (Table 2). This 
finding strengthens our critical assumption that the justification of a penalty is 
exogenous because if the decision is uncorrelated with the full range of 
observable variables, it is more likely that it is uncorrelated also with any 
unobservable variables as well. 
Table 2: t-test results  for the difference in means between justified and unjustified 
penalty kicks 
Pr(|T| > |t|) t-value Variable name 
0.51 0.017 Penalty scored 
0.37 –0.330 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 
0.46 –0.091 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 
0.47 –0.063 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 
0.51 0.036 Crowd behind GK supports kicker 
0.34 –0.400 Crowd behind GK supports GK 
0.37 –0.322 No crowd behind GK 
0.77 0.739 Mixed crowd behind GK 
0.28 –0.575 Kicker's market value 
0.43 –0.177 GK's market value 
0.25 –0.669 Kicker's club market value 
0.28 –0.589 GK's club market value 
0.56 0.148 Kicker's home match dummy 
0.14 –1.098 Kicker's age 
0.13 –1.139 Kicker's penalty performance 
0.45 –0.136 Number of penalty kicks taken by kicker  
0.84 1.015 GK's age 
0.40 –0.259 GK's penalty performance 
0.67 0.454 Number of penalty kicks taken against GK  
0.27 –0.599 Minute in the match 
0.12 –1.181 Round in the season 
0.85 1.052 Difference in Kicker–GK goals during the 
penalty 
Notes: “GK”is an abbreviation for goalkeeper. Source: authors' calculations.  
 
After reducing the possibility of endogeneity, we can use multivariate 
regression analysis to identify the causal effect of trust on scoring an incorrect 
penalty and to test whether our conclusions are statistically significant and 
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robust. Our multivariate analysis follows a conditional probit model for the 
success rate of penalty 𝑖: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑿𝑖) = Φ(𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛽2 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑔 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝜸′(𝑘𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖)
+ 𝜹′(𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖) + 𝜽′(𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖) 
 
(1) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a binary outcome variable that takes the value of 1 if penalty 𝑖 was 
scored and zero otherwise. The variable IS_INCORRECT takes 1 if the call was 
incorrect and its interaction with WVS is the variable of our main interest, 
where g represents the country of the league, the country of the kicker, or the 
continent of the kicker. 
If there is any guilt effect, we expect this variable's effect to be negative: the 
higher the social norms of trust in the country, the lower the chances of scoring 
an incorrect penalty shot. Moreover, by including, side by side, the social 
norms in the country in which the kicker plays (i.e., g=league) and the norms in 
the kicker's location of origin (whether his country or continent), we can test 
and distinguish between the effect external sanctions (shame) and internal 
sanctions (guilt) have on the player. The vectors kicker and goalkeeper include 
kicker and goalkeeper attributes, respectively; while match includes variables 
that are related to the match itself. Basic descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 3.  
We now examine the effect of the explanatory variables on the chances of 
scoring a penalty, with the variable of interest IS_INCORRECT and its 
interactions with the WVS. For this, we estimate the above model using a 
probit model and present the marginal effect of the variables of interest in 
Table 4 (the full regressions can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix.) 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable All penalties good miss 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Penalty scored 1,388 0.78 0.42 1,079 1 0 309 0 0 
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IS_INCORRECT 1,388 0.07 0.26 1,079 0.07 0.26 309 0.07 0.26 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 1,388 26.62 6.51 1,079 26.55 6.50 309 26.87 6.58 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 1,388 25.64 7.67 1,079 25.63 7.64 309 25.65 7.76 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 1,388 23.88 11.19 1,079 23.95 11.19 309 23.65 11.22 
Kicker's age 1,388 27.78 3.84 1,079 27.76 3.78 309 27.87 4.03 
Kicker's market value 1,388 14.53 19.87 1,079 15.23 20.87 309 12.08 15.68 
GK's age 1,388 28.89 4.79 1,079 28.86 4.87 309 28.99 4.48 
GK's market value 1,388 5.16 5.61 1,079 4.96 5.43 309 5.85 6.17 
Kicker's penalty 
performance history 1,362 0.81 0.21 1,063 0.87 0.13 299 0.60 0.29 
Number of penalty kicks 
taken by kicker  1,362 11.06 11.68 1,063 11.46 11.82 299 9.66 11.05 
GK's penalty 
performance 1,331 0.22 0.14 1,026 0.19 0.12 305 0.30 0.18 
Number of penalty kicks 
taken against GK  1,331 17.04 12.53 1,026 16.82 12.58 305 17.78 12.36 
Kicker's club market 
value 1,388 162.27 142.89 1,079 164.83 145.33 309 153.32 133.88 
GK's club market value 1,388 123.77 108.83 1,079 122.24 106.68 309 129.14 116.07 
Kicker's home match 
dummy 1,388 0.61 0.49 1,079 0.61 0.49 309 0.59 0.49 
Minute in the match 1,388 52.44 26.21 1,079 52.17 26.28 309 53.41 25.97 
Round in the season 1,388 17.96 10.49 1,079 17.98 10.48 309 17.88 10.56 
Difference between 
kicker’s and GK’s 
goals during the 
penalty 1,388 -0.01 1.30 1,079 0.02 1.31 309 -0.09 1.26 
Crowd behind GK 
Supports kicker 1,388 0.55 0.50 1,079 0.56 0.50 309 0.50 0.50 
Crowd behind GK 
Supports GK 1,388 0.28 0.45 1,079 0.28 0.45 309 0.31 0.46 
No crowd behind GK 1,388 0.07 0.26 1,079 0.07 0.25 309 0.07 0.26 
Mixed crowd behind GK 1,388 0.03 0.18 1,079 0.03 0.18 309 0.03 0.16 
Notes: “GK”is an abbreviation for goalkeeper. The table includes descriptive statistics of 
all the variables included in our multivariate analysis. An elaborated description of the 
variables and their source can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix.  
 
The first column indicates that without any control, there is no effect of the 
penalty's justification on the probability of scoring. In the second column we 
add all control variables, but still, no significant effect is found. However, 
including the interaction 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 reveals the significant 
difference between leagues, with a negative sign pointing at our assumption 
that the higher the social norms are, the lower is the probability to score an 
incorrect penalty.  
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Table 4: Probit model for penalty conversion rates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Variables goal goal goal goal goal goal goal 
             Only 
foreign 
players 
 Only 
foreign 
players 
IS_INCORRECT –0.00073 0.00524 0.229*** 0.292*** 0.242*** 0.299*** 0.281*** 
 (–0.0426) (–0.0422) (–0.0427) (–0.0273) (–0.0346) (–0.0338) (–0.0314) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇   –0.0145** –0.0131** –0.0112* –0.0154 –0.0191** 
   (–0.00634) (–0.00649) (–0.00664) (–0.00971) (–0.00944) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇    –0.0213***  –0.0200**  
    (–0.00804)  (–0.00899)  
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇     –0.00628*  –0.00646 
     (–0.00374)  (–0.00419) 
Kicker controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Goalkeeper controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Match controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
League fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 754 754 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The full results can be found in Table A.2 
in the appendix. 
 
In order to test whether the effect can be separated into guilt and shame, we 
use the fact that 54.3 of the penalty kickers in our data are players who do not 
play in their home countries and we also include the WVS measure of their 
country or continent of origin. If the effect we find is shame, we assume that 
the norms in the kicker's location of origin will have no additional effect.  
In column (4) we add the 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 variable and find it 
also to be negative and significant. Notice also that the effect of 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×
 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 is practically the same, meaning that these two effects are 
completing each other. In the fifth column we replace 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×
 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 with 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 and again find a significant 
albeit smaller effect. 
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Since the data include both local and foreign players, it would be cleaner 
analytically to use only foreign players for the estimation. In this sixth column, 
we include 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 and 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 
and find a strong effect of both league and continent norms. In column (7) we 
replace 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 with 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 and 
find that the latter is only marginally significant (p-value=0.124). However, an 
F-test for the combined significance of the two interactions clearly shows their 
joint significance. We dive deeper into this result in section 6. 
The estimated effects of the control variables include some interesting results.3 
The player's and the goalkeeper's market value monitors the quality of the 
players, and in the regressions we use the difference between them, divided by 
its standard deviation.4 We find that the value gap has a positive effect on the 
probability of scoring: a one-standard-deviation increase in the quality gap 
between the kicker and the goalkeeper will increase the kicker’s chances of 
succeeding by about 6.5 percentage points. When we include both market 
values, instead of their difference (not shown) we find that an increase of one 
standard deviation of the player's value increases the chance of scoring a goal 
by 5.3 percentage points, and an increase of one standard deviation of the 
goalkeeper's value reduces the chance by 2.6 percentage points. This provides 
evidence that the chance of scoring a penalty kick depends more on the quality 
of the player than on the quality of the goalkeeper.  
We did not find that there is a connection between the effect of the justified 
penalty and the quality of the player and/or the goalkeeper on the chances of 
being rewarded with a penalty (interaction variables). 
This finding is in line with other findings in the literature. Bar-Eli and Azar 
(2009) show that kicks to the upper area of the goal are almost unstoppable 
and that the probability that a highly skilled player will score a penalty is high 
                                                 
3 In the following paragraphs we refer to the results from column 5 in Table A.2 in the 
appendix.  
4 Results do not change if we include both market values or if you divide the values by the age 
of the kicker and the goalkeeper. 
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and is not conditional on the goalkeeper’s abilities. The relative importance of 
the kicker’s performance heightens the interest of our research question, which 
focuses on the kicker’s state of mind. 
Since we do not have data on the teams' position at the time the match was 
played, we instead use the difference between the market value of the kicker's 
and of the goalkeeper's teams. It is well documented that, on average, higher 
market value is correlated with higher league rank, so this variable controls the 
importance of the game. We find that the higher the difference, the lower the 
chance of scoring, and that an increase of one standard deviation in the value 
difference reduces the chance by about 3.5 percentage points. Our 
interpretation is that after controlling for the kicker's and the goalkeeper's 
quality, this variable implies that the lower the importance of the match – that 
is, the bigger the difference – the lower the probability of scoring, probably 
because the kicker is less motivated to score. We did not find a significant 
effect of the interaction between unjustified penalty and the team's value 
difference.  
Finally, we also examined the effect of the crowd located behind the 
goalkeeper. We find that if the crowd that supports the kicker's team is behind 
the goalkeeper and thus facing the kicker, the probability of scoring increases 
by almost 10 percentage points. We also find that a mixed crowd increases the 
probability of scoring, as well. Other crowd compositions have no significant 
effect. 
We also tried to replace our quality measure of market value with the penalty 
history of the kicker and goalkeeper; that is, direct control over the quality of 
the penalty kicks and saves of the kicker and goalkeeper, respectively. When 
we control for these variables, we lose the significance of the variables of 
interest, and their magnitude is cut by about half. It should be noted, however, 
that although the kick quality variable seems ideal for the purpose of our 
study, the control of this variable is not econometrically clean in several 
respects: (1) the kicking history of the kicker is influenced by the winner's 
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success rate, and (2) the success rate of the kicker takes into account the rest of 
the parameters we included in the model; therefore this variable is actually a 
type of result variable. We therefore believe that the kicker and goalkeeper's 
market value is a better control for the kicker’s and goalkeeper's skills. 
In all specifications including the WVS interactions, the dummy 
IS_INCORRECT is found to be positive and significant, meaning that the 
probability of scoring an incorrect penalty kick is significantly higher, 
compared to a correctly awarded penalty. We suggest that this is a 
hypothetical result since in our sample there is no kicker who plays in a league 
and comes from a country whose WVS is zero. In most cases, therefore, the 
overall effect of the incorrectness of the call is zero and lower.  
5. Robustness Tests Using Supplemental Data 
Due to the relatively low number of incorrect penalties, the analysis above is 
subject to the possibility that the distribution of the probability of scoring an 
unjustified penalty kick is randomly assigned between leagues. Hence our 
results might be an artifact. 
In order to better establish our results, we use a "supplemental sample." In 
most of its features, as we show below, this data is very similar to the main 
data (hereafter "the basic sample”). However, it lacks information about the 
market value and age of the kicker and goalkeeper, as well as about the market 
value of the playing teams.  
The supplemental data consists of more than 130 leagues and other national 
and international competitions. However, most of these competitions were not 
fully covered, so the data is scarce. We defined two alternative thresholds for 
leagues to enter our data for the robustness checks: 1) at least 20 penalty kicks; 
2) at least 10 incorrect penalty calls. The data filtered by the first alternative is 
larger, but the results, as we show below, are qualitatively the same. 
Tables 5a and 5b show the basic conversion rates of all correct and incorrect 
penalties, for the supplemental data, filtered by each alternative. The key 
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numbers are very close to each other, and similar to the basic sample statistics: 
the rate of incorrect calls is 8.2%–9.6% compared to 7.4% in the basic sample.5 
Conversion rates are also very similar in all samples, regardless of whether the 
penalty call is correct or not. Hence, we can easily enhance our analysis to 
include the supplemental data, without any bias concerns. 
The combined data gives us much more variance in both 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 and 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦. The range of the WVS included now in the data is wider, 
as can be seen in Figure 4.6 This also enables us, before moving to the 
multivariate analysis, to see the raw connection between the 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 level of 
the league's country and conversion rates of incorrect penalties (Figure 5). The 
negative correlation between the trust indicator and the conversion rates of 
incorrect penalties is straightforward.  
Since some of the control variables are missing, we first made sure that leaving 
them out does not affect our main results (Table 6). In column (1) we show 
again the estimation results from Table 4, column (3), when using the basic 
sample and including the control variables, and in column (2) we show the 
same estimation but without the missing control variables. The differences are 
negligible. Hence, we conclude that the lack of these variables is not critically 
affecting the effect of the variables of interest.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The slight differences can be explained by the fact that referees from the top five leagues are 
probably better than referees from the leagues included in the supplemental data, leagues 
from less developed countries and football culture, among the second and third leagues in 
their countries. 
6 Not all the countries included in the supplemental data have a WVS value. We imputed this 
value from two alternatives: 1) we assigned a country the WVS value of a neighboring country 
that is geographically and culturally close to it; 2) we assigned a country its continent average 
WVS value. In the following analysis we use alternative 1, but the results are not sensitive to 
the chosen alternative. 
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Table 5a: Penalty kicks and conversion rates in the supplemental data, by league, 
kicker's continent, and justification of the call (only leagues in which the number of 
penalties is at least 20) 
  All calls 
True or marginal 
calls 
Incorrect calls 
 
N 
conversion 
rate 
N 
conversion 
rate 
N 
conversion 
rate 
Total 2,923 76.8% 2,681 76.9% 242 75.6% 
 
By league 
Argentina 151 74.8% 141 74.5% 10 80.0% 
Australia 21 85.7% 20 85.0% 1 100.0% 
Austria 125 77.6% 116 76.7% 9 88.9% 
Belgium 165 77.6% 148 77.7% 17 76.5% 
Brazil 263 71.1% 239 69.0% 24 91.7% 
Chile 58 82.8% 55 81.8% 3 100.0% 
Czech Republic 43 88.4% 39 87.2% 4 100.0% 
Denmark 47 91.5% 44 93.2% 3 66.7% 
England 399 73.4% 364 73.1% 35 77.1% 
Finland 24 66.7% 22 68.2% 2 50.0% 
France 42 73.8% 37 73.0% 5 80.0% 
Germany 129 73.6% 118 75.4% 11 54.5% 
Greece 72 80.6% 69 81.2% 3 66.7% 
Ireland 24 75.0% 22 81.8% 2 0.0% 
Italy 248 81.0% 228 81.1% 20 80.0% 
Japan 106 79.2% 99 82.8% 7 28.6% 
Mexico 111 75.7% 103 74.8% 8 87.5% 
Netherlands 200 73.0% 181 72.9% 19 73.7% 
Norway 42 76.2% 37 75.7% 5 80.0% 
Poland 61 78.7% 55 80.0% 6 66.7% 
Portugal 113 80.5% 103 79.6% 10 90.0% 
Romania 115 82.6% 109 83.5% 6 66.7% 
Russia 57 71.9% 52 75.0% 5 40.0% 
Scotland 45 77.8% 43 76.7% 2 100.0% 
Spain 95 80.0% 83 81.9% 12 66.7% 
Sweden 39 66.7% 39 66.7% 0 NA 
Switzerland 68 82.4% 60 85.0% 8 62.5% 
Turkey 36 72.2% 35 71.4% 1 100.0% 
USA 24 83.3% 20 80.0% 4 100.0% 
 
By kicker's continent of origin 
Africa 111 74.8% 106 74.5% 5 80.0% 
Asia 135 77.0% 125 80.8% 10 30.0% 
Australia 24 83.3% 22 81.8% 2 100.0% 
Europe 1,843 77.6% 1,686 78.1% 157 73.2% 
North America 17 88.2% 14 85.7% 3 100.0% 
South America 793 74.5% 728 73.5% 65 86.2% 
Source: author's calculations. 
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In column (3) we use the full sample for estimation with the limited number of 
control variables7, leaving out leagues with less than 20 penalty kicks. The 
effect of 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 remains negative and significant, even though cut by 
half. The effect of 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 however is only marginally significant (p-
value=0.126), but an F-test for the combined significance of these two variables 
clearly shows their joint significance. In column (4), we estimate the model 
after leaving out more competitions, using the threshold of at least 10 incorrect 
penalty calls, and find a significant negative effect of both 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 and 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
In columns (5), (6), and (7) we replace 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 with 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 and 
estimate the model using only the available control variables for the three 
samples: the basic sample, the full sample limited by the number of penalty 
kicks, and the full sample limited by the number of incorrect penalty calls, 
respectively. In all cases, we find a negative effect of the 𝑊𝑉𝑆 variables, and 
where the effect is not significant (Column 6), an F-test clearly shows a joint 
significant effect. 
The critical conclusion we derive from using the supplemental data is that our 
results are most likely not driven by any random process, indicating that there 
is a causal link between social norms, guilt feelings, and incorrect penalties 
conversion rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Since the supplemental data includes also second and third tier leagues, we added 2 control 
dummy variables for second and third leagues. 
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Table 5b: Penalty kicks and conversion rates in the supplemental data, by league, 
kicker's continent and justification of the call (only leagues in which the number of 
incorrect penalties is at least 10) 
  All calls 
True or marginal 
calls 
Incorrect calls 
 
N 
conversion 
rate 
N 
conversion 
rate 
N 
conversion 
rate 
Total 1,306 75.8% 1,180 75.8% 126 76.2% 
 
By league 
Belgium 165 77.6% 148 77.7% 17 76.5% 
Brazil 185 72.4% 163 69.9% 22 90.9% 
England 399 73.4% 364 73.1% 35 77.1% 
Germany 129 73.6% 118 75.4% 11 54.5% 
Italy 227 81.1% 209 80.9% 18 83.3% 
Netherlands 106 75.5% 95 76.8% 11 63.6% 
Spain 95 80.0% 83 81.9% 12 66.7% 
By kicker's continent of origin 
Africa 50 76.0% 47 74.5% 3 100.0% 
Asia 15 73.3% 14 78.6% 1 0.0% 
Australia 4 75.0% 4 75.0% 93 72.0% 
Europe 1,005 76.4% 912 76.9% 29 89.7% 
North America 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 
South America 230 73.5% 201 71.1% 126 76.2% 
Source: author's calculations. 
  
 Figure 4: Can most people be trusted?  
 
Notes: The share of positive answers in countries whose leagues are included in the supplemental data. The shares are the average 
of the reported shares in the 2005–2009 and 2010–2014 surveys where available, or the latest reported share in countries that were 
not surveyed twice. The full sample and supplemental data leagues average is the non-weighted average of all countries in the 
WVS (around 80) or all countries whose leagues are included in our supplemental data, respectively. Source: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jspy 
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Figure 5: Goal rate in incorrect penalty kicks versus WVS 
(in leagues with at least 10 incorrect calls) 
 
Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jspy and author's 
calculations. 
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Table 6: Probit model for penalty conversion rates – basic and supplemental data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (6) 
Dep. Variables goal goal goal goal  goal goal goal 
 WVScontinent  WVScountry 
 Basic 
sample 
Basic sample, fewer 
controls 
Full sample 
(penalties>=20) 
Full sample 
(incorrect 
penalties>=10) 
 Basic sample, fewer 
controls 
Full sample 
(penalties>=20) 
Full sample 
(incorrect 
penalties>=10) 
IS_INCORRECT 0.292*** 0.294*** 0.226*** 0.275***  0.244*** 0.127*** 0.204*** 
 (–0.0273) (–0.0273) (–0.0276) (–0.0224)  (–0.0345) (–0.039) (–0.0381) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 –0.0131** –0.0136** –0.00291 –0.00587* 
 
–0.0115* –0.00285 –0.00577* 
 (–0.00649) (–0.00646) (–0.0019) (–0.00312)  (–0.0066) (–0.00246) (–0.00328) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 –0.0213*** –0.0211*** –0.0112*** –0.0154*** 
 
   
 (–0.00804) (–0.00806) (–0.00341) (–0.00493)     
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇     
 
–0.00615* –0.00291 –0.00497* 
      (–0.00373) (–0.00231) (–0.00286) 
Kicker controls Yes No No No   No No 
Goalkeeper controls Yes No No No   No No 
Match controls Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 1,388 1,388 4,283 2,694   4,283 2,694 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The full results can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
 
  
6. Distinguishing between Shame and Guilt 
In this section we further investigate the difference between the norms in the 
country where the kicker plays and the country where he comes from. The fact 
that players tend to miss unjustified penalty kicks when playing in leagues 
located in countries with higher norms can either be a result of guilt or shame. 
That is because norms within the country derive the response from the media 
and fans when an unjustified penalty is taken and scored, so a kicker might 
tend to miss this kind of penalty kick in order to avoid shame and not because 
of his own sense of guilt. However, a foreign player might be affected both by 
the norms in the country in which he plays but also by the norms from the 
country from where he comes. The norms of foreign players can be separated 
to norms that affect the level of shame the player might be exposed to and the 
norms that affect the level of guilt he will fell if he scores an unjustified penalty 
kick. 
In order to do that, we amend Model (1) and add interactions between a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if the player is foreign (and 0 otherwise), the 
IS_INCORRECT dummy variable and both the WVS in the league and in the 
player's country of origin. Formally, we estimate: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑿𝑖) = Φ(𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 × 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖
+ 𝜽′𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝝋
′𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖) 
 
(2) 
Since we use the full data and not only the 5 major leagues data, we do not 
include unavailable kicker's and goalkeeper's variables, but match controls and 
all other possible interactions between the variables in our primary interest 
interactions are included. The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
  
 Table 7: Probit model for penalty conversion rates – including foreign interactions 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variables goal goal 
  Full sample 
(penalties>=20) 
Full sample 
(incorrect 
penalties>=10) 
IS_INCORRECT 0.0647 0.168*** 
 (–0.0558) (–0.0563) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 –0.00352* –0.00884** 
 (–0.00209) (–0.00366) 
𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 0.211*** 0.210*** 
 (–0.0344) (–0.0589) 
𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 –0.00556 –0.00311 
 (–0.00421) (–0.0063) 
𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 –0.00507* –0.00601* 
 (–0.00301) (–0.00352) 
Other interactions terms Yes Yes 
Kicker controls No No 
Goalkeeper controls No No 
Match controls Yes Yes 
League fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4,283 2,694 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The full 
results can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
 
Consistent with the above analysis, the norms of the country of the league 
(𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇) are still negatively and significantly affecting 
the probability of scoring a penalty kick. We also find that foreign players are 
not affected differently by the norms in the country in which they play, 
compared to their local peers. However, we do find that on top of the norms in 
the country in which they play, the probability of foreign players scoring 
unjustified penalty kicks decreases with the level of the norms in their country 
of origin (𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇). We also find that 
foreign players’ baseline probability of scoring an unjustified penalty kick  
(𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 ) is higher. However, this is only a partial 
effect; in order to calculate the probability of scoring, one should take into 
account all of the relevant dummy and interaction variables. For instance, the 
 WVS value in England stands at 30,  while the average WVS of foreign players 
in England stands at 27.6.8 This implies that, ceteris paribus, the probability of 
local players in England scoring an unjustified penalty kick is 10.5 percent 
lower than the baseline probability, while the probability for an average 
foreign player in England is just 3.4 percent9 lower than the baseline 
probability. This difference is consistent over most leagues and is a result of 
the fact that foreign players come from countries with lower WVS values than 
the leagues in which they play. 
To summarize this section, the analysis we've undertaken involves both a 
measure of norms in both the countries in which foreign players play and in 
their countries of origin shows that even after controlling for the first, the 
second also significantly affects scoring probability. We interpret this result as 
indicating that both guilt and shame play roles that affect the performance of 
penalty kickers’ . 
7. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the effect of guilt on performance by exploiting a 
novel measure of the justification of penalty calls. We find that unjustified 
penalty calls are negatively correlated with penalty conversion rates, 
conditional on the level of social norms in the country's league and in the 
kicker country or continent of origin. 
We believe that the correlation we find reflects an adverse “guilt effect.” We 
have ruled out a wide range of alternative explanations by controlling for a 
broad set of variables. Our conclusions are statistically significant and robust, 
the findings based on rich data from the top five European football leagues 
                                                 
8 This is a result of multiplying the marginal effect of 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 by the 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 in England: (–0.00352 X 30) = –0.1056. 
9 This is a result of multiplying the marginal effect of  
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 by the 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒, in England, adding the product of  
𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 ×  𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 and the average 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 of foreign players in 
England and adding the coefficient of the interaction variable  
𝐼𝑆_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 × 𝐼𝑆_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇: (–0.00352 X 30) + (–0.00507 X 27.6) + 0.211 = –0.0344. 
 and based on a large sample (though more limited data produces similar 
results).  
Exploiting the variance arising from players who do not play in their countries 
of origin by including the norms of both the league and the kickers’ location of 
origin, we can separate the guilt and shame, or more generally, constraints on 
egoism to internal sanctions and external sanctions. We find that both guilt 
and shame play a role affecting penalty kicker's performance. 
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 Appendix A. Tables and Figures 
Table A.1: List of variables, their description and source 
source description Variable name 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
is it a good penalty (1=yes, 0=no) 
Penalty scored 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
is it a justified call (1=yes, 0=no) 
IS_INCORRECT 
World Values 
Survey 
Percent of "yes" answers to the question "can 
most people be trusted" in the league's 
country 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒  
World Values 
Survey 
Percent of "yes" answers to the question "can 
most people be trusted" in the kicker's 
country 𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  
World Values 
Survey 
Kicker's continent average percent of "yes" 
answers to the question "can most people 
be trusted" in the kicker's continent of 
origin 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡  
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
Is the crowd behind the goalkeeper 
supporting the kicker's team? (1=yes, 
0=no) 
Crowd behind GK 
supports kicker 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
Is the crowd behind the goalkeeper 
supporting the goalkeeper's team? (1=yes, 
0=no) 
Crowd behind GK 
supports GK 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
Is there no crowd behind the goalkeeper? 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
No crowd behind GK 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
Is the crowd behind the goalkeeper divided 
between kicker and goalkeeper's' team 
supporters? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Mixed crowd behind GK 
Transfermarkt.com Kicker's market value (Euro mil.) Kicker's market value 
Transfermarkt.com Goalkeeper's market value (Euro mil.) GK's market value 
Transfermarkt.com Kicker's team market value (Euro mil.) Kicker's club market value 
Transfermarkt.com GK's team market value (Euro mil.) GK's club market value 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
Is the match played at the kicker's team home 
stadium? (1=yes, 0=no) 
Kicker's home match 
dummy 
Transfermarkt.com Kicker's age Kicker's age 
Transfermarkt.com 
% of successful penalties since 2000 and until 
the season preceded the kick's season 
Kicker's penalty 
performance 
Transfermarkt.com 
Number of penalties taken from 2000 until 
the season preceded the kick's season 
Number of penalty kicks 
taken by kicker  
Transfermarkt.com GK's age GK's age 
Transfermarkt.com % of penalties GK stopped from 2000 until GK's penalty performance 
 the season preceded the kick's season 
Transfermarkt.com 
number of penalties taken against the 
goalkeeper since 2000 and until the season 
preceded the kick's season 
Number of penalty kicks 
taken against GK  
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
which minute in the match the penalty was 
taken 
Minute in the match 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
league round of the match Round in the season 
Redwood 
International 
Sports  
the difference between the kicker's team 
number of goals and the opponent at the time 
of the penalty kick  
Kicker–GK goals difference 
during the penalty 
             Notes: “GK”is an abbreviation for goalkeeper. 
  
 Table A.2: Probit model for penalty conversion rates – all variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Variables goal goal goal goal goal 
            
IS_INCORRECT –0.00073 0.00446 0.229*** 0.292*** 0.242*** 
 (–0.0426) (–0.0423) (–0.0426) (–0.0273) (–0.0344) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒X IS_INCORRECT   –0.0146** –0.0132** –0.0112* 
   (–0.00635) (–0.00649) (–0.00664) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 X IS_INCORRECT    –0.0215***  
    (–0.00804)  
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 X IS_INCORRECT     –0.00633* 
     (–0.00373) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒    –0.00134 –0.00179 –0.002 
   (–0.00234) (–0.00237) (–0.00241) 
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡     0.00215  
    (–0.00156)  
𝑊𝑉𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦      0.00111 
     (–0.00115) 
Kicker–GK value gap / 1 standard 
deviation  0.0652*** 0.0648*** 0.0664*** 0.0653*** 
  (–0.0196) (–0.0195) (–0.0194) (–0.0195) 
Kicker–GK team value gap / 1 
standard deviation  –0.0343* –0.0346* –0.0359* –0.0357* 
  (–0.0185) (–0.0184) (–0.0184) (–0.0184) 
Kicker's age  0.00166 0.00168 0.00182 0.00173 
  (–0.00307) (–0.00307) (–0.00307) (–0.00309) 
GK's age  –0.00186 –0.00191 –0.0021 –0.00199 
  (–0.0024) (–0.0024) (–0.0024) (–0.00241) 
Home game dummy  –0.0261 –0.025 –0.0247 –0.0254 
  (–0.0321) (–0.0322) (–0.0321) (–0.0322) 
Minute in the match  –0.00057 –0.00057 –0.00058 –0.00057 
  (–0.000439) (–0.000439) (–0.000439) (–0.000439) 
Round in the season  0.00085 0.000772 0.000864 0.00076 
  (–0.00112) (–0.00112) (–0.00112) (–0.00112) 
Difference between kicker’s and 
GK’s goals during the penalty  0.00647 0.00664 0.00744 0.00734 
  (–0.00913) (–0.00913) (–0.00912) (–0.00914) 
Year  –0.0122 –0.0125 –0.0131 –0.012 
  (–0.00923) (–0.00922) (–0.00919) (–0.00925) 
Crowd behind GK supports GK  0.102** 0.101** 0.0992** 0.0983** 
  (–0.0473) (–0.0472) (–0.0471) (–0.0472) 
No crowd behind GK  0.0426 0.0406 0.039 0.0377 
  (–0.0483) (–0.0483) (–0.0483) (–0.0485) 
 Mixed crowd behind GK  0.0341 0.0321 0.0319 0.0312 
  (–0.0538) (–0.0539) (–0.0537) (–0.054) 
Crowd behind GK supports kicker  0.108** 0.106* 0.107** 0.108** 
  (–0.0544) (–0.0548) (–0.0539) (–0.0544) 
Observations 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 1,388 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
